This paper investigates the valuation effects of corporate international diversification by examining cross-border mergers and acquisitions of U.S. acquirers over the period 1990-1999. We find that, on average, acquisitions of "fairly valued" foreign business units do not lead to value discounts. Consistent with the industrial diversification discount literature, unrelated cross-border acquisitions result in a significant diversification discount of about 24 percent after accounting for the valuation of foreign targets. Furthermore, significant wealth gains accrue to foreign target shareholders regardless of the type of acquisition. Overall, our results suggest that international diversification does not destroy value while industrial diversification leads to discounts even after controlling for the pre-acquisition value of the target.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the integration of global financial and product markets has been accompanied by increases in the number and fraction of firms that operate in international markets, and to a large extent cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been an important driving force to propel such a globalization 1 . Despite its prevalence, research on the valuation effects of corporate international diversification has been relatively sparse and has yielded mixed results. Although earlier studies report evidence of a significantly positive relation between internationalization and firm value [see, for example, Senbet (1981, 1984) , Kim and Lyn (1986) , and Morck and Yeung (1991) ], recent empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) corroborate the prior evidence on the positive effects of corporate international diversification on firm value, whereas Christophe (1997) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) find evidence that international operations are associated with value destruction.
To shed further light on this important issue, we examine a sample of U.S. firms that expand globally via cross-border M&As. There are at least four reasons for focusing on cross-border M&As. First, many divisions of multinational corporations (MNCs) arise via cross-border takeovers. Second, it will allow us to observe the firm's diversification status resulting directly from the act of adding new business units rather than subjective segment reporting by the firm's managers 2 . Third, we will be able to measure the market value of the foreign target firms as well as compare their underlying characteristics with those of U.S. benchmarks 3 . Since a number of recent studies have argued that the diversification discount can be a biased result if there are significant differences between divisions of conglomerates and the stand-alone firms to which they are benchmarked, it is 1 According to the Mergers and Acquisitions Annual Almanac (1992 Almanac ( -2000 , the number of cross-border deals in the world increased from 7,096 in 1991 to 12,899 transactions in 1999. In terms of U.S. dollar value, the volume of international deals was equivalent to about $304 billion in 1991, while it totaled $1.376 trillion in 1999. In particular, the number of U.S. acquisitions of non-U.S. companies during the 1990s increased sharply as well, from 532 in 1991 to 1,034 transactions in 1999. In terms of dollar value, the volume of such acquisitions was about $57 billion in 1991, while it totaled $247 billion in 1999. 2 For example, Hayes and Lundholm (1996) argue that segment reporting, as an accounting event, is often subject to strategic managerial motives. 3 Differences in firm characteristics are likely to be more pronounced since target operations depend on different trade policies, products and factor markets, corporate governance systems, and imperfections and informational asymmetries of foreign capital markets.
important to gauge the extent to which foreign targets might differ from the domestic benchmarks 4 . Fourth, our approach will build on the work of Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) to determine how much of the post-merger change in the excess value of the multinational acquirer can be traced directly to the valuation status of the target firm prior to the takeover event. This is particularly important since recent work of Moeller and Schlingemann (2002) suggests that from the perspective of U.S. acquirers, cross-border acquisitions differ from domestic transactions.
We study 136 cross-border M&As involving U.S. acquirers of foreign target firms over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . We find no evidence of a significant decrease in excess values of the U.S. acquiring firms in the two-year period surrounding the acquisition 5 .
The valuation analysis also indicates that, on average, the foreign targets are not significantly valued at either a discount or a premium in their last year of operation as stand-alone firms. Taken together, our results suggest that the act of cross-border acquisition does not lead to any value destruction.
Furthermore, we find that merging firms in related cross-border M&As does not destroy value, while U.S. acquirers involved in unrelated cross-border M&As experience a significant post-merger change in their excess values of approximately -24 percent.
This reduction in value occurs even after controlling for the relative value of the target prior to the acquisition. This result suggests that unrelated cross-border acquisitions lead to value destruction and is, therefore, consistent with the large evidence on "industrial diversification discount" 6 . Finally, we also document significantly positive changes in 4 For example, Chevalier (2000) investigates how the hypothesis of inefficient cross-subsidization among divisions of conglomerates could be related to the selection bias and finds that some of the investment patterns commonly attributed to cross-subsidization within conglomerates may be explained by systematic differences between the investment opportunities of conglomerates and those of stand-alone firms. Whited (2001) addresses the measurement error in Tobin's Q related to the hypothesis of inefficient crosssubsidization among divisions of conglomerates. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) show that in U.S M&As, acquisitions of already-discounted targets significantly reduce the average excess value of the acquiring firms, even if the act of combining firms does not necessarily lead to any value destruction. Villalonga (2002) also reports that conglomerates and stand-alone firms differ in multiple characteristics. She uses propensity score matching to reduce selection bias and finds that the diversification discount vanishes, or even turns into a significant premium. 5 We use the same valuation methodology as in Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , which represents a variation of the industry-matched multiplier approach originally developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) . 6 For an extensive literature on industrial diversification discount, see Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) , Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , Servaes (1996) , Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) , Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , and Servaes (1999, 2002) .
foreign target shareholder wealth, regardless of the type of acquisition under consideration.
We also conduct robustness tests that control for endogeneity as in Campa and Kedia (2002) by pooling our globally diversified firms with their stand-alone U.S.
benchmarks in a two-way fixed-effects framework, which includes both firm-specific and year fixed effects 7 . The results of this analysis suggest that the introduction of firm fixed effects does not support the hypothesis that valuation effects of corporate international diversification can be explained by unobserved firm-specific characteristics.
In summary, we find that international diversification does not destroy value in that acquisitions of "fairly valued" foreign firms, on average, do not lead to an international diversification discount. In addition, our valuation results are consistent with past evidence that MNCs tend to trade at a premium relative to industry-matched uninational firms. However, we find that cross-border M&As that occur in unrelated industries do indeed lead to value destruction, which is consistent with the existence of an industrial diversification discount. Overall, our results suggest that the underlying characteristics of the foreign acquired firms are important for valuing MNCs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the literature regarding the valuation effects of corporate international diversification. Section 3 describes the sample selection procedures, data sources and the valuation methodology.
Section 4 analyzes the valuation effects of cross-border M&As and then investigates the issues of selection bias and endogeneity. Section 5 concludes the paper.
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION

Corporate International Diversification Motives
The internationalization theory has its roots in Caves (1971) , who advocates that substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) occurs mainly in industries characterized by 7 Campa and Kedia (2002) show that firm value and diversification discount are endogenously related. Once the endogeneity is accounted for, the observed diversification discount is significantly reduced and in some cases, it turns out to be a premium. Hyland and Diltz (2002) find that diversified firms were already valued at a discount prior to diversifying. On the other hand, Lamont and Polk (2002) show that the observed discount is not a consequence of endogeneity problems. They find that exogenous changes in certain market structures such as product differentiation and oligopoly. The firm can increase its market value by internalizing the market imperfections for valuable firmspecific assets. Senbet (1981, 1984) advance theoretical explanations for the valuation effects of corporate international diversification based on the idea of capital market imperfections. Due to the presence of investment barriers that are costly and whose costs are not uniform across firms and individual investors, the shares of MNCs should trade, in equilibrium, at a premium because these firms provide investors with indirect portfolio diversification services through their operations abroad. In this case, MNCs act as a costly financial intermediary and investors recognize this by bidding up their stock price vis-à-vis those of purely domestic firms. According to Senbet (1979) and Errunza and Senbet (1981) , imperfections characterized by differences in taxation across countries may also explain value creation. Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) explore the idea that MNCs have the opportunity to exploit a variety of market conditions, especially due to the increasing uncertainty in international markets, based on the functionality of their production networks and the flexibility of their cost structure. MNCs possessing such specific characteristics (i.e., flexibility options) should be more valuable than comparable domestic firms. Thus, multinational corporate expansion should give rise to valuation premium if the benefits outweigh the agency costs of international diversification 8 .
Empirical Evidence on the Valuation Effects of International Diversification
The early studies on the value of international diversification were based on either a riskadjusted performance analysis [Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975) , and Brewer (1981)] or international analogues of return-generating processes [Agmon and Lessard (1977) , and Jacquillat and Solnik (1978) ]. Table 1 presents a comprehensive summary of the empirical findings and methodological features of the main studies on the valuation effects of corporate international diversification.
investment diversity are negatively related to changes in excess value, giving support to the causal effect of industrial diversification. 8 Viewing MNCs as complex structures, the costs to corporate international diversification can also arise from agency problems when managers have incentives to cause the firm to grow beyond its optimal size [Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Jensen (1986) ].
The empirical results of Errunza and Senbet (1981) show that the degree of international involvement is significantly positively related to excess market value, and such a relationship is even stronger during periods characterized by restrictions on capital flows. Other studies also corroborate the evidence of positive effects of corporate international diversification on firm value. For example, Errunza and Senbet (1984) expand their previous valuation analysis by controlling for firm size and introducing different measures of the degree of corporate international involvement, and find evidence of a positive relation between firm value and corporate international diversification. Kim and Lyn (1986) , and Morck and Yeung (1991) find support for the positive valuation effects of international diversification under the hypothesis that MNCs can internalize the market imperfections for their intangible assets abroad. On the other hand, Christophe (1997) shows that MNCs have significantly lower Q ratios than domestic firms do, and the largest discounts occur during the first half of the 1980s when the U.S. dollar is strongest. However, he does not control the MNC subsample for industrial diversification, nor does he compare the Q ratios of MNCs with those of (specialized) domestic firms matched in the same industry.
Two recent studies examine the independent valuation effects of industrial and international diversification in a framework that simultaneously controls for both forms of corporate diversification in order to avoid the correlated omitted variable problem. The omitted variable problem is a natural issue of concern due to the fact that many conglomerates are also "globally" diversified firms. By segmenting the data into four subsamples of firms (single-segment domestic firms, multi-segment domestic firms, single-segment MNCs, and multi-segment MNCs), in which the single-segment domestic firms represent the benchmark group used to calibrate the valuation effects of the three other subsamples, Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) find that the average diversification premium for MNCs is statistically significant and equivalent to 2.7 percent 9 . Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) develop an empirical valuation analysis similar to that in Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) and find evidence of significant diversification discounts for both specialized MNCs (18 percent) and diversified MNCs (32 percent).
In summary, the evidence suggests a significant positive relationship between multinationality and firm value, that is, MNCs trade at an international diversification premium. Although more recent results based on industry-matched benchmarks are inconclusive with respect to change in premia from international diversification, these studies [e.g., Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) ] have not explicitly considered, for example, how selection bias could affect their valuation results. Therefore, in this paper, we reexamine the value of international diversification using M&A activity, a setting where Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) argue is natural to study these issues. Furthermore, we apply the methodology of Campa and Kedia (2002) to address any potential endogeneity in our findings. Overall, our analysis takes into account selection bias, the underlying characteristics of the foreign acquired firms in valuing MNCs, and the role of endogeneity in international diversification decision.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND VALUATION METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection and Data Sources
The sample selection procedure begins by identifying an initial sample of 11,392 crossborder transactions involving U.S. acquirers of foreign target firms registered on the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . The data sources and the series of data filters used to refine the sample are described more fully in 
Sample Segmentation and Diversification Status
The overall sample of 136 cross-border M&As is a heterogeneous group with respect to a few features such as the degree of business relatedness between the U.S. acquiring firms and the foreign targets, the degree of international involvement of the U.S. acquiring firms, and target firms' corporate governance systems. This allows us to segment the sample firms according to two different criteria that may help contrast the subsample conclusions with those drawn from the overall (heterogeneous) sample.
First, we consider the business relatedness between U.S. acquiring and foreign target firms at the time the takeover takes place. If the U.S. acquirer and the foreign target firm report operations with the same two-digit SIC code, we classify the acquisition as related, and unrelated otherwise. This type of relatedness classification is also used by Berger and Ofek (1995) , Servaes (1996) , Chevalier (2000) and Lamont and Polk (2002) .
Based on this classification scheme, we can assess how these two different forms of corporate international diversification affect the value of the acquiring firms as well as how the selection bias is specifically related to the valuation of specialized and diversified MNCs. In our sample, 88 out of a total of 136 cross-border M&As are classified as related, whereas 48 are classified as unrelated cross-border M&As.
Second, we group the sample firms according to whether the cross-border acquisition represents the "premiere" way through which the U.S. acquiring firm establishes operations abroad. Going abroad for the first time, in terms of establishing production operations in a foreign location for the first time, might induce significant changes in the firm's operations status quo and, accordingly, the value of the acquiring firm might sharply change as well. For the U.S. acquiring firms with established operations abroad, we expect a less drastic change in firm value as compared to the situation in which a firm goes abroad for the first time. Hence, if the U.S. acquiring firm has no operations abroad at the time the takeover occurs, we then classify the acquisition as premiere cross-border operation, and non-premiere otherwise. We identify the international involvement status of the U.S. acquiring firms from the Compustat Geographic Segment (CGS) database, by checking the CGS code for the firms two years backwards until the effective year of the acquisition. We find that 31 out of a total of 136 cross-border M&As are classified as premiere cross-border operations, whereas 105 are classified as non-premiere operations.
Excess Value Measures
We use the excess value measure as defined in Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , which represents a variation of the industry-matched multiplier approach originally developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) . The excess value (EV) compares a firm's market value (the market value of common equity plus the book value of total debt plus the liquidating value of preferred stock) to its imputed value (IV).
For each business segment of a diversified firm, we search for a group of matching single-segment domestic firms with the same two-digit SIC code, and then calculate the median ratio of the market value to sales (assets) for this matching group of specialized domestic firms, that is, the industry-matched sales (asset) multiplier. The imputed value for each business segment of a diversified firm then equals the business segment's reported sales (assets) multiplied by the industry-matched sales (asset) multiplier. The excess value measure for a given firm i at time t can be represented as follows, . We use the industry definition based on the twodigit SIC code grouping that includes at least five stand-alone firms so as to ensure that the industry-matched multipliers are representative. Moreover, in calculating the industry-matched multipliers, we disregard firm-years with total sales less than $20 million and whose Compustat incorporation code is greater than zero (FINC > 0), that is, non-U.S. incorporated firms.
As shown in Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) , the choice of the accounting method in M&As (e.g., the choice of purchase versus pooling accounting) can lead to potential valuation problems when one uses industry-matched asset multipliers. More specifically, since all identifiable assets acquired and liabilities assumed in a business combination using the purchase accounting should be assigned a portion of the cost of the acquired target, normally equal to their face values at the date of acquisition, the book value of total assets of the newly combined firm will reflect the purchase price of the target. In other words, the book value of total assets is "marked-to-market", which induces a negative bias into Equation [1.1] (i.e., larger asset-based imputed values) when U.S. acquirers are valued in the year following the acquisition. This accounting effect is particularly important in this paper because, as reported in Table 3 , approximately 87 percent of the cross-border M&As in our sample use purchase accounting. Therefore, we will focus on sales-based figures when analyzing our results, even though we report the results for the asset-based calculations as well.
VALUATION ANALYSIS
Comparing Firm-Specific Characteristics
We first consider the differences in underlying characteristics among U.S. acquirers, foreign targets and U.S. benchmarks 11 . Much of the literature argues that some firmspecific characteristics might affect firm value. Caves (1971) develops a theoretical argument emphasizing that corporate value can increase when firms are able to internalize market imperfections for their intangible assets abroad. Kim and Lyn (1986) , Morck and Yeung (1991) , Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) provide empirical support for research and development (R&D) and advertising expenditures as proxies for firm-specific (intangible) assets. Capital structure (debt) is also used to control for the valuation effects that may result from financial leverage.
From the industrial diversification literature, Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , and Servaes (1996) show the importance of controlling for firm size. Other factors such as growth opportunities (investment) and profitability are also included as additional corporate control variables. shows that in the first year following the acquisition event (t = +1), U.S. acquirers of foreign target firms experience an overall, significant increase in their mean and median sizes as proxied by total capital, sales, or assets. In general, the q-ratio proxies for a firm's incentive to invest in new assets, and it will supposedly do so as long as q > 0 (i.e., as long as the firm is still overvalued). We can observe that, even though the U.S.
acquirers' q-ratios are all positive in the year prior to the acquisition (t = −1), the mean (median) q-ratio based on sales displays an insignificant decline of 7.04 percent (9.92 percent) following the acquisition. On the other hand, the mean (median) q-ratio based on assets significantly decreases by 15.64 percent (16.64 percent). However, as previously reported in Table 3 , since the vast majority of U.S. acquirers use purchase as the accounting method, in which the book value of total assets is usually increased to reflect the purchase price of the target, a negative bias is likely to affect the asset-based q-ratio at t = +1. It is important to note that these q-ratios are not adjusted for industry effects since the market value of the firm is not being compared to its imputed value regarding each of its business segments. As for the remaining underlying characteristics of U.S. acquirers, we can also observe a significant mean (median) rise in financial leverage of about 5 percent (5 percent), while profitability, firm-specific assets and investment levels display no significant change over the two-year period surrounding the acquisition.
In Panel B, we compare U.S. firms to their foreign acquired counterparts at t = −1.
Overall, we find strong evidence that U.S. acquiring firms are significantly bigger than the foreign targets across all proxies used and at any conventional levels of statistical 12 Total capital is the sum of market value of common equity, book value of total debt, and the liquidating value of preferred stock. The q-ratio_Sales (q-ratio_Asset) is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of total capital to sales (total assets). Leverage is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to total assets. EBIT/Sales stands for earnings before interest and tax expenses normalized by sales. R&D/Sales represents research and development expenditures divided by sales, and CAPEX/Sales is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. The q-ratios for the foreign target firms are calculated using the market value of common equity based on the last stock price available prior to delisting. In addition, the market and accounting data for the foreign targets have been converted to U.S. dollar values using the corresponding National Exchange Rate Quotes provided by Datastream. significance. For instance, the mean (median) sales for foreign targets correspond to approximately 10 percent (12 percent) of the U.S. acquirers' mean (median) sales before they combine their business operations, and such results are indicative of the relatively small size of the acquired foreign targets in our sample. U.S. acquirers are significantly overvalued relative to the foreign target firms; their mean (median) sales-based q-ratio is about 30 percent (35 percent) larger than that of the foreign targets at the one percent level. In addition, U.S. acquiring firms are more financially levered as well as more profitable than the foreign targets, but there is no significant evidence that the merging firms differ in terms of firm-specific advantages or growth opportunities.
Panel C reports contemporaneous differences in mean and median values between 136 foreign target firm-years and 5,635 U.S. stand-alone firm-years specifically used to value the foreign target firms, without matching these two groups of firms to their particular industries. Due to skewness in the distributions, we emphasize medians rather than means. Overall, foreign target firms are significantly bigger than U.S. stand-alone firms at the one percent level. In addition, there is weak evidence that foreign targets may have less firm-specific advantages and higher growth opportunities than U.S. stand-alone firms. In Panel D, we calculate the contemporaneous industry-adjusted differences in firm-specific characteristics between foreign targets and U.S. specialized firms by subtracting the median value for a group of U.S. specialized firms from a foreign target's actual value when they share the same two-digit SIC code. After adjusting for industrymedian effects, we still find evidence that foreign targets are significantly bigger than U.S. stand-alone firms. In addition, besides having lower median R&D expenses, foreign target firms do not seem to differ from U.S. benchmarks in their other underlying characteristics. Particularly interesting is the evidence that there is no significant median difference in the q-ratios between foreign target and U.S. benchmark firms. Overall, the simple univariate analysis suggests that foreign target firms are relatively small in size, but otherwise have similar financial characteristics as their U.S. benchmark firms. We next examine the valuation effects of cross-border M&As over the two-year period surrounding the acquisition.
Examining the Valuation Effects of Cross-Border M&As
We calculate excess values of U.S. acquirers in the year prior to the acquisition (t = −1)
as well as excess values of the combined firms (U.S acquirer + foreign target) in the year following the acquisition (t = +1), using industry-matched stand-alone U.S. firms as benchmarks. We disregard the effective year of the acquisition (t = 0) because excess value measures based on accounting data as of t = 0 may not properly represent year-long value performance for many of our sample firms after they combine their operations. Table 5 reports excess values for U.S. acquirers in the year prior to the acquisition (EV -1 ), in the first year following the acquisition (EV +1 ), as well as the actual change in excess values from t = −1 to t = +1, which is defined as follows,
In Panel A, we present the valuation measures for the full sample of 136 U.S. In summary, there is strong evidence that MNCs tend to trade at a significant premium relative to industry-matched uninational firms in the two-year period surrounding the acquisition. Further, we find no evidence of a significant decline in excess values in our full sample of cross-border M&As. Related cross-border acquisitions are not associated with a reduction in firm value, however, unrelated acquisitions lead to significant discounts consistent with the effect of industrial diversification. Finally, going abroad for the first time through the acquisition of foreign firms seems to result in a greater economic loss than that for globally established acquirers, but the small size of our subsample does not allow a meaningful statistical test. We next examine the valuation status of the foreign target firms in their last year of operations as stand-alone firms.
Examining the Valuation Status of the Foreign Target Firms
We calculate two measures of excess value for the foreign target firms in their last year of operations as stand-alone firms. The first measure stands for the pre-announcement excess value ( A EV 1 − ) and is calculated using the market value of common equity observed one month before the announcement of the acquisition. The second measure represents the pre-effective excess value ( E EV 1 − ) and is computed using the market value of common equity based on the last stock price available prior to the date on which the target firm is delisted. The main difference between these two measures is that the former does not take into account the valuation effects due to the acquisition announcement. Thus, the difference between these two measures of excess value can reflect the change in foreign target shareholders' wealth ( 1 − ∆EV ) associated with the cross-border acquisition such that,
In Table 6 , we report the two excess value measures as defined above and the change in target shareholders' wealth as given by Equation [3] . In addition to looking at the valuation status of the foreign targets prior to the acquisition, it is also useful to have an idea about the target size relative to the overall combination of the merging firms, and then relate both information to the actual change in the excess values of U.S. acquiring firms. We define the relative size of the acquisition as the ratio of the foreign target's sales (assets) to the combined sales (assets) of both foreign target and U.S. acquirer in the year prior to the acquisition. firms acquires not only much larger foreign targets but also more deeply discounted foreign targets, even though such discounts are statistically insignificant. Overall, the results from Table 6 indicate that targets tend to trade at discounts prior to the M&A announcement, but are "fairly valued" by the time the acquisition is consummated.
Examining the Relationship Between Excess Values of the Merging Firms
We next examine whether the post-merger change in excess values of U.S. acquirers is related to the pre-merger valuation status of the newly acquired foreign target firms. We first need to compute the projected excess value, which represents the excess value measure the merging firms would have if they combined their operations instantaneously in the year prior to the acquisition event. The projected excess value ( The results for the regression model above are presented in Table 8 . We emphasize mostly the sales-based results (Panel A) and report asset-based results for completeness. Regression 1 shows that the estimated intercept of the regression (−0.0292) is not significantly different from zero (P-value = 0.467). This result is consistent with that reported in the first panel of Table 7 , since it indicates that no additional, significant value loss occurs after accounting for the valuation status of the foreign targets. The estimated regression coefficient on the projected change in excess values is 0.5071, which is reliably different from one (P-value = 0.009). In this case, the projected change in excess values explains only 4.30 percent of the cross-sectional variation in the actual change in excess values.
With respect to the differential valuation effects according to the business relatedness of cross-border acquisitions (Regression 2), the intercept term now captures the additional valuation effects of unrelated cross-border acquisitions that cannot be accounted for by the underlying characteristics of the foreign targets. It turns out that the estimated intercept (−0.1769) is significantly less than zero (P-value = 0.007), indicating that unrelated cross-border acquisitions result in a significant decline in excess values beyond the valuation effects from simply combining foreign targets with U.S. acquiring firms. This result confirms those reported in the third panel of Table 7 . Moreover, related cross-border acquisitions exhibit an incremental positive impact on the U.S. acquirers' excess values according to the estimated coefficient on the related-acquisition indicator variable (0.2282), which is significantly greater than zero (P-value = 0.005). Not surprisingly, the projected change in excess values is still a poor predictor of the actual changes in excess values. The estimated beta coefficient (0.5039) is significantly different from one (P-value = 0.008), and the model can now explain about 9.30 percent of the cross-sectional variation in the actual change in excess values.
Finally, the results from Regression 3 also corroborate those reported in Table 7 Summarizing our valuation results, we first find that acquisitions of "fairly valued" foreign firms, on average, do not lead to diversification discount. This result is consistent with the combined evidence that foreign acquired targets do not significantly differ from the corresponding industry-matched U.S. stand-alone firms, and that they are significantly smaller than their U.S. acquiring counterparts. Thus, accounting for the underlying characteristics of the target firms has important implications on the actual change in excess values of U.S. acquiring firms. Therefore, the results support the view that selection bias hypothesis may play a role in valuing divisions of MNCs based on industry-multiplier approaches. Second, we provide new evidence that unrelated crossborder M&As result in significant value loss after accounting for the valuation of the foreign targets, thus corroborating the industrial diversification discount. On the other hand, related cross-border M&As do not destroy value. Finally, we document significantly large wealth gains for the foreign target shareholders in cross-border acquisitions, regardless of the type of acquisition considered. In the next section, we explore the issue of whether excess firm value and the international diversification decision are endogenously related.
Investigating the Endogeneity of the International Diversification Decision
We next reexamine our findings in a setting that is mindful of the potential endogeneity between firm attributes and value. To the extent that firm-specific characteristics are likely to be correlated with firm value, we model U.S. acquirers' excess value as a function of both the observable and unobservable firm-specific characteristics over the two-year period surrounding acquisition. We first estimate ordinary least squares ( there is weak evidence of a diversification discount (−8.89 percent), even though both point estimates are not statistically significant. However, the post-merger change in the sign of the point estimates of the valuation effects from positive to negative somewhat reconciles with the univariate results previously reported in the first panel of Table 5 regarding the insignificant average decline in excess values for U.S. acquirers. The results for the asset-based OLS regressions virtually show the same evidence, except that, in the year before the acquisition, U.S. MNCs are valued at a premium (13.30 percent) that is significant at the one percent level. Overall, both the statistical significance and the signs of the coefficient estimates for the other control variables conform with those reported by Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) , Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , and Campa and Kedia (2002) . For instance, we find evidence that excess values are positively related to firm size, capital expenditures, and R&D expenditures, and negatively related to leverage. We also find evidence that the coefficient estimate of the square of firm size is significantly negative (except for the asset-based result at t = +1), indicating that the positive effect of firm size on excess value decreases as firm size increases.
We next control the valuation analysis for unobservable firm-specific characteristics that might affect excess firm value by estimating a fixed-effects model in a panel data framework as defined in Hausman and Taylor (1981) . At the same time, we also introduce year dummies to control for time effects that might affect the international diversification decision. The basic idea is to assign a unique intercept for each firm in our sample in order to capture an average latent firm-specific effect on excess value that might potentially be correlated with the other control variables included in our regression framework. Hence, in the presence of such correlations, the coefficient estimates from the OLS regressions may be biased and inconsistent. In introducing firm-specific fixed effects, we order our sample firm-year observations by firm and then by time to define unbalanced panel data for both the year prior to and the year following the acquisition 14 .
We report the estimates of our multivariate valuation analysis with firm-specific and year fixed effects (i.e., a two-way fixed effects) for both sales and asset multipliers in columns 2 and 4 of Table 9 , respectively. The introduction of two-way fixed effects at t = −1 (Panel A) does not alter the statistical insignificance of the sales-based diversification premium for internationally diversified U.S. acquiring firms, even though the economic magnitude of such a premium now declines from 7.82 percent (OLS estimate) to 4.24 percent. On the other hand, the point estimate on INTL_DIV based on asset multipliers substantially changes from a significant premium of 13.30 percent (OLS estimate) to a statistically insignificant discount of −7.84 percent. As for the other control variables, the signs of the sales-based coefficient estimates on these variables are invariably robust to the inclusion of fixed effects, but the statistical significance in some cases is sensitive to the fixed-effects specification. For example, the positive effect of EBIT/Sales on excess values now becomes statistically significant, whereas the negative effect of both Furthermore, the signs and statistical significance of the sales-based coefficient estimates on the other control variables are now more robust to the inclusion of fixed effects. Thus, the post-merger results from pooling the globally diversified U.S. firms with their standalone U.S. benchmarks in a fixed-effects framework support the evidence that international diversification does not appear to be correlated with unobserved firmspecific characteristics.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the valuation effects of corporate international diversification within the context of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Consistent with theoretical expectations, MNCs are valued at a significant premium relative to industry-matched U.S. benchmarks. We find no evidence of a significant decline in excess values of U.S.
acquirers, given that the foreign targets are "fairly valued" relative to the industrymatched benchmarks. Indeed, the foreign target firms do not differ from the U.S.
benchmarks in most of their underlying characteristics, and accounting for such characteristics is important for ex post valuation status of U.S. acquiring firms. Overall, our results suggest that the act of cross-border acquisition does not lead to value destruction.
Consistent with industrial discount literature, our results suggest that unrelated cross-border acquisitions lead to additional value loss after accounting for the underlying characteristics of the foreign targets. On the other hand, we find weak evidence that related cross-border acquisitions may be value-enhancing beyond simply adding "fairly valued" foreign firms to U.S. acquirers. We also find weak evidence of an incremental decline in excess values when U.S. firms establish operations abroad for the first time.
However, this value reduction occurs because such acquisitions involve foreign targets that are valued, on average, at an economically sizeable discount, and not because premiere cross-border acquisitions destroy value. Thus, the selection bias seems to affect the post-merger valuation of U.S. "first-timers". U.S. firms with operations already established abroad do not experience any significant change in excess value after accounting for the characteristics of the target firms. Our results do not suggest that excess firm value and the international diversification decision are endogenously related.
Finally, we document significantly positive changes in foreign target shareholder wealth regardless of the type of acquisition. Subtract: (a) U.S. acquirers for which foreign targets are either privately held firms or public companies without pre-merger accounting data available (1,213) (b) U.S. acquirers for which neither data on stock price/shares outstanding nor accounting data is available from Compustat ( 12) (c) U.S. acquirers reporting business divisions in the financial services industry according to the Compustat Industry Segment Files
Final Compustat-Worldscope-Datastream sample of U.S. acquirers and foreign target firms 136 Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Acquirers, Foreign Targets and U.S. Valuation Benchmarks Descriptive statistics for a sample of 136 U.S. acquiring firm-years (Panel A), 136 foreign target firm-years (Panels B, C, and D), and 5,635 U.S. single-segment firm-years specifically used as benchmarks to value the foreign targets (Panels C and D) over the period 1990-1999. Total capital is the sum of market value of common equity, book value of total debt, and the liquidating value of preferred stock. The q-ratio_Sales (q-ratio_Asset) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total capital to sales (total assets). Leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to total assets. EBIT/Sales represents earnings before interest and tax expenses divided by sales. R&D/Sales stands for research and development expenditures normalized by sales. CAPEX/Sales represents capital expenditures divided by sales. STD refers to the standard deviation and N stands for the number of yearly observations available to calculate each of the firm-specific measures described above. The q-ratios for the foreign target firms are calculated using the market value of common equity based on the last stock price available prior to delisting. In Panel D, the industry-adjusted difference in firm-specific characteristics between foreign target and U.S. benchmark firms is calculated as the contemporaneous difference between a foreign target's actual value and the median value for a group of matching stand-alone domestic firms with the same two-digit SIC code. The significance of the difference in means is based on the parametric t-statistics, while the significance of the difference in medians is assessed using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test statistics. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table displays excess value (EV) measures for U.S. acquirers in the year prior to (EV -1 ) and the year following (EV +1 ) the acquisition, as well as the actual change in EV from year t = − 1 to year t = + 1 (∆EV +1 ). Excess value, calculated as in Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) , and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , which represents a variation of the industry-matched multiplier approach originally developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) , is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual market value to its imputed value. A firm's imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its business units, with each business unit's imputed value equal to the business unit's sales (assets) multiplied by the median ratio of market value to sales (assets) for all single-segment domestic firms in the same industry. The full sample (Panel A) consists of 136 non-financial, publicly traded U.S. firms that completed an acquisition of a majority ownership stake in a non-financial, publicly traded foreign target firm over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] Berger and Ofek (1995) . The relative size of the acquisition (Rel_Size -1 ) is measured as the ratio of the target's sales (asset) to the combined sales (assets) of both the target and the U.S. acquirer in the year prior to the acquisition. The full sample (Panel A) consists of 136 non-financial, publicly traded foreign targets acquired by non-financial, publicly traded U.S. firms over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . Acquisitions are classified as related cross-border M&As (Panel B) when the U.S. acquirer and the foreign target report the same two-digit SIC codes in the year t = − 1, and as unrelated (Panel C) otherwise. Acquisitions are classified as non-premiere cross-border operations (Panel D) when the U.S. acquirer already has operations overseas in the year prior to the acquisition, and as premiere cross-border operations (Panel E) otherwise. N refers to the number of yearly observations in each subsample. The significance of the mean values and of the difference in means is based on the parametric t-statistics. The significance of the median values is based on the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics, while the significance of the difference in medians is assessed using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test statistics. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Sales Multiples
Asset ) and EV -1 . The projected excess value is based on the preeffective market value of the target firm, and represents the excess value the merging firms would have if they were combined instantaneously in the year prior to the actual acquisition. ∆EV U +1 represents the unexplained change in excess value, and is calculated as the difference between ∆EV +1 and EV P +1 . Excess value is calculated as in Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) , and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , which represents a variation of the industry multiplier approach originally developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) . The full sample (Panel A) consists of 136 non-financial, publicly traded U.S. firms that completed an acquisition of a majority ownership stake in a non-financial, publicly traded foreign target firm over the period 1990-1999. Acquisitions are classified as related cross-border M&As (Panel B) when the U.S. acquirer and the foreign target report the same two-digit SIC codes in the year t = − 1, and as unrelated cross-border M&As (Panel C) otherwise. Acquisitions are classified as non-premiere cross-border operations (Panel D) when the U.S. acquirer already has operations overseas in the year prior to the acquisition, and as premiere cross-border operations (Panel E) otherwise. N refers to the number of yearly observations in each subsample. The significance of the mean values and of the difference in means is based on the parametric t-statistics. The significance of the median values is based on the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics, while the significance of the difference in medians is assessed using the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test statistics. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Excess value is calculated as in Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) , and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , which represents a variation of the industry multiplier approach originally developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) . Panel A reports the sales-based results, while Panel B presents the regression results based on asset multiples. In Regression 1, ∆EV P +1 is the only predictor variable in the model. An indicator variable for business relatedness of the acquisition, I (Relatedness), equals one when the acquisition is classified as related, and zero otherwise (Regression 2). An indicator variable for the international involvement status of U.S. acquiring firms, I (Premiere), equals one if the U.S. acquirer already has operations overseas prior to the acquisition, and zero otherwise (Regression 3). Standard errors are presented in parentheses, and the two-sided P-values for the null hypothesis that α = 0, β = 1, γ = 0 are reported in brackets. and a set of control variables, based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and fixedeffects estimation. Under the fixed-effects specification, we introduce both firm-specific and year-specific fixed effects (i.e., a two-way fixed effects model). The valuation analysis of the 136 cross-border M&As is carried out in two stages: in the year prior to the acquisition (Panel A), the sample consists of 6,649 domestic single-segment firm-year observations and 136 U.S. acquiring firm-year observations. In the year following the acquisition (Panel B), the sample consists of 5,857 domestic single-segment firm-year observations and 136 U.S. acquiring firm-year observations. Excess value, calculated as in Bodnar, Tang and Weintrop (1999) , and Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's market value to its imputed value. The variable INTL_DIV takes the value one when the Compustat Geographic Segment (CGS) database reports foreign sales for the firm and zero otherwise. The remaining control variables are relative measures calculated as the difference between the actual value for the firm and the median value for the domestic single-segment firms matched with the same two-digit SIC code. LTA stands for the relative natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is calculated as the relative ratio of book value of total debt to total assets. EBIT/Sales represents the relative ratio of earnings before interest and tax expenses to sales. R&D/Sales stands for the relative ratio of research and development expenditures to sales. CAPEX/Sales is the relative ratio of capital expenditures to sales. SQ_LTA represents the relative square of the natural logarithm of total assets. The regression coefficients are estimated based on robust standard errors, and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses below.
Panel 
